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Abstract 
I  examine  the  extent  to  which  the  FASB’s  agenda  determination  is  a  function  of  the 
contemporaneous  preferences  of  its  primary  constituents:  auditors,  preparers,  and  financial 
statement users. Using the FASB’s consultation with the FASAC as a lens through which to 
view constituent preferences, I find evidence that from 1982 to 2001 influence on FASB agenda 
decisions is concentrated among “Big N” audit firms, whereas from 2002 to 2006 the preferences 
of financial constituents appear most significant. Across both periods, I find no evidence of 
significant preparer influence in agenda formation, which is in contrast to their documented role 
in later stages of standard setting.  Collectively, the results contribute to our understanding of the 
influence of constituents in standard setting and highlight a shift in that influence over time. 
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1. Introduction 
The formation of a regulatory agenda is of critical import to the regulated; determination 
of the agenda dictates regulatory direction and, ergo, the economic costs and benefits that may 
accrue to the regulated (Arrow 1951, Plott 1976). Accordingly, self-interested constituents have 
strong incentives to lobby for agenda admission of regulatory initiatives projected to be net-
beneficial and exclusion of projects expected to result in net costs. Within accounting, prior 
research has explored the influence of constituent lobbying in the determination of US GAAP; 
however, this literature has focused primarily on the exposure draft to final standard stage due to 
data availability in the form of constituent comment letters (e.g. Watts and Zimmerman 1978). 
By contrast, the agenda setting process is largely characterized by archival opacity, severely 
limiting the development of empirical research, despite recognition by that agenda setting is 
potentially  the  most  “crucial  determinant  of  accounting  standards”  (Gipper  et  al  2013),  yet 
remains “one of the least understood and least appreciated” (Beresford 1993).
1 
In this paper, I utilize hand-collected data to shed light on the political dynamics  that 
surround FASB agenda decisions and provide exploratory empirical evidence on the influence of 
constituent lobbying on FASB project selection.  In particular, this paper explores the “balance” 
between the competing preferences of auditors, preparers and financial statement users and asks 
whether such “balance” has changed over time.   
To  obtain  an  archival  perspective  on  constituent  preferences,  I  leverage  a  unique 
institutional feature of the FASB’s agenda setting process: formal consultation with an advisory 
council  (FASAC)  composed  of  auditors,  preparers,  and  financial  statement  users 
                                                            
1 Gipper et al. (2013) note that with the exception of Leftwich (1995), marked preliminary and incomplete, this 
paper is the first to provide empirical evidence on FASB agenda decisions. Leftwich (1995) was unable to discern 
systematic patterns in FASB agenda decisions between 1978 and 1995, concluding that future research is needed.   
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proportionately selected to “represent the Board’s constituency in microcosm” (FAF 1984) and 
charged to advise the FASB regarding its “agenda of projects and the assigning of priorities 
thereto” (FASB 1973). Formally, FASAC opinions are solicited through an annual survey on the 
“Priorities  of  the  FASB”  (hereafter,  FASAC  Survey),  which  affords  construction  of  a 
quantitative measure of contemporaneously expressed constituent agenda preferences. Although 
there are other avenues for constituent communication, the FASB asserts that, “given its broad 
membership, which mirrors the Board’s key constituencies, there is a special significance to the 
Council’s  assessment”  (FAF  1986).  Accordingly,  data  on  FASAC  preferences  constitute  a 
unique  vantage  from  which  to  estimate  the  broader  political  dynamics  surrounding  FASB’s 
agenda decisions.  
A common limitation to lobbying studies is the difficulty of assessing ex-ante regulator 
preferences.    Absent  such  a  measure,  studies  rely  on  alignment  of  policy  outcomes  with 
constituent lobbying as evidence of influence (or stronger capture), while ignoring the possibility 
that such outcomes might simply reflect the independent preferences of regulators.  Analysis of 
FASAC surveys provides a unique opportunity to overcome this barrier; for a subset of years, 
FASAC  Surveys  polled  FASB  members  in  tandem  with  FASAC  members,  enabling  me  to 
directly control for the Board’s ex-ante preferences in tests of constituent influence.  
The present study analyzes 323 agenda decisions made by the FASB from 1982 to 2006 
for which an  explicit numerical  priority rating  from  FASAC members  is  available from  the 
Summary of Responses to the FASAC Survey. My initial tests regress the FASB’s decision to 
include a potential project in its technical agenda on the average priority rating assigned to that 
project by FASAC members while controlling for FASB member ex-ante preferences. Due to a 
change in survey structure in 2002 (detailed in Section 3.1), my analysis is split into two panels:  
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1982-2001 and 2002-2006. Results from both samples provide support for the hypothesis that 
constituent’ preferences matter, on average, in determination of the board’s agenda, and that 
FASAC member priorities provide a meaningful proxy through which to detect influence. 
The  second  stage  of  my  analysis  involves  building  a  biographical  database  of  the 
professional  affiliations  of  all  242  FASAC  members  who  served  between  1982  and  2006. 
Drawing on prior literature, I classify FASAC members into the three primary groups—auditors, 
preparers,  and  financial  constituents—viewed  as  having  distinctly  different  incentives  and 
priorities for accounting standards (e.g. Cyert and Ijiri 1974)
2. Although the FASB expressly 
commits,  in  its  conceptual framework and elsewhere,  to prioritize the needs of investors , 
creditors, and other financial statement users (broadly termed financial constituents), they have 
also committed to “balancing” need demands of a diverse constituency, and extant literature has 
illustrated the potential influence of auditors, (Haring 1979, Puro 1985) and preparers (Saemann 
1995, Ramanna 2008) on standard setting outcomes. It is thus unclear, ex-ante, which (if any) 
group’s preferences will manifest in FASB agenda decisions. Moreover, longitudinal evidence of 
constituent influence across issues and over time is lacking in current literature.  Prior empirical 
studies examine only a small subsample of accounting topics—usually a single issue. However, 
lobbying is likely a multi-period game, making it difficult to draw wide inferences from what is 
observed in a single period (Amershi, Demski, and Wolfson 1982).  The aim of this paper is to 
provide systematic longitudinal evidence on whether the FASB has, on average, “balanced” the 
                                                            
2 Consistent with the FASB’s classification of financial statement users in FAF annual reports, financial is defined 
as members associated with the banking, insurance, or securities industries. However, as discussed later in 2.3.2 it is 
unclear whether the incentives of financial constituents will stem from their role as users or preparers; accordingly 
the term financial rather than user is employed in my classification of FASAC members.  
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needs  of  its  constituents  in  its  agenda  decisions,  or  whether  the  preferences  of  certain 
constituents appear persistently dominant. 
In  particular  economic  theory  suggests  that  successful  lobbying  necessitates  the 
mobilization of both political and economic resources to become informed about agenda issues, 
to secure preferential access to regulators and to influence (or coerce) those regulators to adopt 
preferred  positions  (Becker  1983;  Austen-Smith  1987;  1993;  1995).  Acknowledging  this 
likelihood, in the third stage of analysis, I further hone my classification of FASAC members by 
size.    Specifically,  I  test  for  differential  influence  of  the  Big  N  audit  firms,  Fortune  500 
companies  and  large  financial  institutions  relative  to  their  smaller  counterparts.  Since  its 
inception the FASB has been subject to criticisms asserting capture by these powerful entities 
(e.g. US Congress 1976), however dominance of such constituents is not a foregone conclusion.  
Representational  organizations  may  constitute  a  powerful  lobbying  channel  for  the  views  of 
smaller  constituents,  as  might  the  SEC  who  has  historically  advocated  the  needs  of 
unsophisticated, smaller investors.   
  From 1982 to 2001, I find evidence that auditor preferences are afforded significantly 
greater weight in the FASB’s selection of agenda projects than are the preferences of financial 
constituents  and  preparers.  Although  less  influential  than  auditors,  results  suggest  financial 
constituents’ preferences also matter, potentially indicative of some degree of “balance” in the 
FASB’s  agenda  setting.  However  such  “balance”  appears  to  exclude  preparers;  across 
specifications I fail to find any evidence of preparer influence. Moreover, after disaggregating 
constituencies’  by  size  I  find  no  evidence  of  “balance”  in  FASB  agenda  decisions.  Once 
constituencies  are  disaggregated  by  size,  regression  results  suggest  influence  is  exclusively  
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concentrated in the hands of those historically accused of undue influence, namely, Big N audit 
firms.  
Separate regression results suggest a marked shift in FASB agenda priorities post 2002.  
From  2002-2006,  only  the  preferences  of  financial  constituents  appear  significant  in  FASB 
agenda  decisions;  auditor  preferences  are  insignificant  across  all  specifications  as  are  the 
preference of preparers.   Likewise, disaggregation of constituents by size yields no evidence of 
Big N auditor influence. Notably, analysis by size suggests the influence of financial constituents 
is  attributable  to  both  large  and  small  financial  representatives,  contrary  to  expectations  of 
dominance by those endowed with greater economic resources but potentially consistent with 
increasing regulatory emphasis on prioritizing the needs of all users. 
The  split  sample  design  of  my  results  precludes  direct  causal  analysis,  however,  the 
ascendency  of  financial  (relative  to  auditor)  preferences  post  2002  is  consistent  with  the 
increasing influence of the financial industry on standard setting, as documented in Allen and 
Ramanna  (2013).  Additionally,  the  diminished  influence  of  auditors  post  2002  may  be 
congruous  with  regulatory  and  institutional  initiatives  designed  to  bolster  the  FASB's 
independence from special interests and increase user influence in standard setting including, the 
independent funding provisions of Sarbanes Oxley
3 and the establishment of several new  user 
advisory committees to the FASB.
4 However, the institutions representing financial constituents 
may, themselves, constitute a special interest rather than pure user group (e.g. Young 2006, Lev 
1988),  and  there  are  numerous  other  factors  which  may  have  affected  this  shift  in  relative 
                                                            
3 SOX §109 provides funding for the FASB through a mandatory accounting fee imposed on US companies, and 
replaced a voluntary contributions structure that  potentially  rendered the FASB financially beholden to  Big N 
auditors and large preparers for a significant portion of its annual operating funds.  
4  Between 2003 and 2005, the FASB established the Users Advisory Council, Investors Technical Advisory 
Committee, and Investors Task Force with the intent to increase user participation in its due process.  
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constituent influence. Disentangling these alternative factors is not possible in the confines of my 
archival  dataset;  notwithstanding,  the  evidence  presented  in  this  paper  can  provide  a  useful 
starting point for future research. 
Results  of  my  analysis  are  robust  to  the  inclusion  of  numerous  substantive  and 
econometric controls including, among others, controls for the influence of the Securities and 
Exchange  Commission,  concurrent  development  of  International  Accounting  Standards  and 
related convergence initiatives, media attention, and year fixed effects.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides institutional background 
on the FASAC and on the FASB’s agenda decision process and develops related hypotheses. 
Section  3  describes  the  sample  selection  and  construction  of  variables.  Section  4  presents 
descriptive  statistics  and  multivariate  regression  design.  Section  5  presents  and  interprets 
multivariate results. Section 6 describes robustness tests, and Section 7 concludes.  
2. Institutional background and hypothesis development 
2.1 FASB agenda decisions and constituent influence 
The FASB screens far more topics than there are resources available to address and, 
consequently, in any given year, rejects the vast majority of potential agenda items (Beresford 
1993).  Of  those  items  which  do  make  the  agenda,  a  high  percentage  progress  through  to 
completion; of 67 agenda items added between 1982 and 2006 only 4 (6%) are subsequently 
dropped while the remaining 63 projects have generated over 100 authoritative standards to date, 
highlighting the significance of agenda control on regulatory outcome.  
Admission to the FASB’s agenda is by Board consensus utilizing the following factors 
about  potential  agenda  topics  to  guide  the  FASB’s  analysis:  the  pervasiveness  of  the  issue, 
alternative  solutions,  technical  feasibility,  practical  consequences,  convergence/  cooperative  
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opportunities  and  resources.  The  FASB  further  asserts  that  it  is  a  neutral  and  independent 
regulator  “weigh[ing]  carefully  the  views  of  its  constituents”  in  pursuit  of  “on  balance 
judgments” (Brown 1984). Leftwich (1995) notes, however, that agenda decisions are largely 
subjective;  there  is  likely  little  agreement  among  users,  preparers,  and  auditors  about  what 
constitutes a problem, what level of diversity in practice is appropriate, or whether a conceived 
alternative solution will improve financial reporting. The economic consequences of changes in 
accounting standards are rarely evenly distributed across the FASB’s constituents (e.g., Watts 
and Zimmerman 1978, Holthausen and Leftwich 1983, Fields, Lys, and Vincent 2001) and it is 
unlikely, even in theory, that a change in accounting standards will be uniformly preferred by all 
participants in the economy (Demski 1973).  
Preparers, bearing the brunt of implementation costs and concerned about a potential 
reduction in reporting flexibility, may rationally exhibit a high propensity to oppose accounting 
change and may overemphasize potential economic costs of any new standard. Ceteris paribus, 
preparers also prefer greater latitude for management judgment.
5 Auditors’, on the other hand, 
may  strategically  lobby  for  accounting  change;  proliferation  of  new  standards  may  increase 
demand for audit services and professional expertise.
6 Likewise, promulgation of proscriptive 
standards may curb management opportunities for discretion, and decrease auditors’ potential 
legal liability. Finally, financial statement users may have incentives to advocate for accounting 
change;  standards  that  provide  new  decision-useful  information  or  increase  the  reliability  of 
existing  information  benefit  users.  The  construct  of  a  pure  user  group  may,  however,  be 
                                                            
5 Preference for flexibility does not necessarily imply perverse incentives to mislead investors.  Preparers argue that 
users are best served by management best practices tailored to a firm’s underlying economics  
6 The preferences of auditors may be influenced by the preferences of their clients; however, such alignment is 
presumed strategic: audit firms lobby directly in their own interests which may converge or diverge from those of 
their clients (Watts and Zimmerman 1982, Puro 1984, Allen, Ramanna and Roychowdhury 2014).   
8 
idealistic (e.g., Young 2006) and the FASB itself has historically expressed frustration over the 
scarcity of user participation in its processes (Beresford 1993). In practice, users are represented 
on  the  FASAC  by  financial  firms  in  the  “banking,  securities  and  insurance  industries” 
(collectively  financial).  Many  of  these  firms  are  themselves  also  preparers  of  financial 
statements  and  may  advocate  on  certain  issues  accordingly,  potentially  obfuscating  the  link 
between financial constituents and the pure user interests the FASB seeks to promote. Thus, it is 
unclear ex-ante how the FASB should balance the competing needs of its diverse constituency 
and ex-post how it could be evaluated for success on this criterion.  
Adding to the challenge of “balancing”, looms the possibility that FASB decisions may 
be over-ruled by the SEC or Congress, that its standard setting authority may be revoked, or that 
financial or institutional viability of the organization may be undermined if the FASB is deemed 
to  be insufficiently responsive to  the needs of  its  constituents. These pragmatic institutional 
concerns likely create political barriers to  neutral “optimization” of the agenda even if such 
objective function could be clearly defined. Additionally, FASB members may have pre-existing 
ideological  biases  stemming  from  their  past  employment  that  translate  into  systematically 
different  priorities  in  optimizing  over  various  constituencies’  preferences  (e.g.  Allen  and 
Ramanna 2013), and may attenuate the potential for uneven distributional outcomes.  
Across its history, the FASB has repeatedly been accused by disgruntled constituents and 
regulators that it is insufficiently responsive to aggregate public interest or at the extreme that its 
agenda has been subject to regulatory capture. Evidence to support these claims, however, has 
been mixed as well as limited by data constraints to only a small subset of FASB decisions.
7 The 
                                                            
7 Examining a small sample of exposure drafts,  Haring (1979) and Puro (1985) find evidence that FASB decisions 
reflect the preferences of the large accounting firms, whereas Brown (1981) does not  and Hussein and Ketz (1980) 
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intent of this paper is to provide evidence on systematic constituent influence over the FASB’s 
history, and to offer insights into how the relative balancing of constituent preferences may have 
shifted over time.  In addition  to  constituent  preferences,  the  FASB’s agenda is  undoubtedly 
responsive  to  numerous  other  economic,  legal  and  political  trends.
8  These forces are likely 
embedded in constituent preferences; however, it is outside the scope of this study to estimate 
their direct effects. 
2.2 The Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council  
Constituent  participation  in  the  FASB’s  agenda  setting  process  is  institutionalized 
through the Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council (FASAC), established concurrent 
with the FASB in 1973 and tasked to advise the Board concerning the addition and prioritization 
of projects to its technical agenda  (FASB 1978). FASAC members serve part time and,  are 
selected by the FASB’s parent organization (the FAF) on the basis of professional affiliation to 
ensure that the Council remains “broadly representative of preparers, auditors, and users of 
financial information” in their respective constituencies (FASB 2007). In communicating with 
the FASB, FASAC members are encouraged to share materials with and solicit views from their 
associates  to  increase  the  representativeness  of  its  input.  The  FASB  asserts  that  it  relies  on 
FASAC to provide a “window through which the Board can obtain and discuss the representative 
views of the[se] diverse groups” (FASB 2013) and that it “would not add [any] major project to 
its agenda without first discussing that project with FASAC” (FAF 1996).  
                                                                                                                                                             
report mixed evidence. More recently Saemann (1995) and Ramanna (2008) find evidence of the FASB yielding to 
preparers’ demands in formulation specific final standards.  
8 For example, Bertomeu and Magee (2011) develop a model in which the agenda of accounting regulators i s a 
function of economic cycles and political demands.  
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Formally, FASAC agenda priorities are solicited at quarterly meetings with the FASB 
and though an annual survey entitled “Projects and Priorities of the FASB” (hereafter, FASAC 
Survey). From 1982 to 2001 the FASAC Survey solicited quantitative ratings from members for 
a selective amalgamation of potential projects brought to the FASB’s attention throughout the 
year by the FASAC, Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF), SEC, and any other constituents. From 
2002 to 2006, in lieu of a list, FASAC members were asked to identify on a blank sheet of paper 
the five projects they viewed as most important for the FASB to address.
9 Results of the annual 
FASAC Survey are tabulated and presented  together  with  council members’  comments  in  a 
document entitled “Summary of Responses to the FASAC Annual Survey,” which is distributed 
to Board members and discussed at a subsequent meeting of the FASB.
10 Data from FASAC 
Surveys provides quantitative, objective and contemporaneous data  from which to estimate the 
otherwise archivally opaque interaction between the FA SB and it’s constituency across time. 
Given FASAC’s mandate, composition and outreach efforts, these data constitute a meaningful 
proxy  for  the  broader  constituent  lobbying  environment  surrounding  the  FASB’s  agenda 
decision.  
2.3 Hypothesis development 
2.3.1 Average constituent preferences and FASB agenda decisions 
The  general  proposition  that  regulators  attempt  to  optimally  balance  the  demands  of 
competing constituents is well established in both the economics and political science literatures 
(Becker 1983, Grossman and Helpman 2002), but as discussed in the preceding section, the 
precise mechanism for balancing these demands is difficult to specify ex-ante. Cognizant of the 
                                                            
9 The 2002 shift in survey structure was intended to better solicit “the accounting and financial reporting issues that 
were the most challenging,” in an environment characterized by “uncertainty and transition.” (FASAC 2002/2003) 
10 Appendix A provides illustrative excerpts from the 1998 and 2002 FASAC Surveys and Summaries of Responses.   
11 
competing  economic  consequences  and  political  implications  of  its  standards,  it  is  easy  to 
imagine  the  FASB  might  attempt  to  maximize  its  utility  by  undertaking  only  those  agenda 
projects for which it expects criticism will be minimal relative to the accolades it anticipates 
across  its  entire  constituency  (Wilson  1980).  Pragmatically  however,  lacking  credible 
information about the preferences its broad constituency, the FASB is reliant on the subset of 
information provided by those constituents willing to engage in its due process. Optimizing its 
decisions, then, will involve some subjective determination as to the appropriate weighting of 
this information.  
The consultative role and representative composition of FASAC suggest that its existence 
may have been institutionalized to facilitate such optimization. If this is the case, one might 
conjecture that the simple average of FASAC member preferences, readily available to Board 
members  in  the  Summary  of  Responses  to  the  FASAC  Survey,  may  constitute  a  pragmatic 
weighting heuristic for FASB agenda decisions. Lending weight to this supposition, Figure 1 
reveals that although variation exists, the general proportion of auditors, preparers, and financial 
representatives appointed to the FASAC has remained relatively stable over time.
11 Between 
1982 and 2006, the FASAC averaged 33 members, proportionally distributed as follows:  23% 
auditors,  30%  preparers,  29%  financial,  and  18%  others.  Accordingly,  my  first  hypothesis, 
stated in terms of the alternative, is as follows. 
[H1] The probability that a topic will be added to the FASB’s technical agenda is, ceteris 
paribus, increasing in the average project priority FASAC members assign to that topic.  
Although H1 intuitively resonates, establishing this baseline result is a non-trivial first 
step in my analysis; no systematic evidence currently exists on constituent preferences at the 
agenda  setting  stage.  Furthermore,  although  economic  theory  postulates  the  necessity  of  the 
                                                            
11 Members of FASAC are classified as auditors, preparers, financial and other, as detailed in Section 3.3.2.    
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Board  appearing  responsive,  this  need  not  translate  into  agenda  decision  outcomes.  Board 
members may  use  FASAC  input opportunistically,  citing constituent  preferences  for support 
when they naturally align with the Board’s predetermined selections, and citing its independent 
jurisdiction or invoking the symbolic overriding public-interest of users (e.g., Young 2006) when 
they  do  not.  Stated  otherwise,  it  is  possible  that  constituent  preferences  are  manifest  in  the 
Board’s agenda only to the extent that they correlate positively with FASB members’ ex-ante 
preferences. By including a control for FASB member ex-ante preferences (see Section 3.4.1) H1 
is designed to test for agenda responsiveness in fact rather than just in appearance.   
2.3.2 Differential influence of auditors, preparers, and financial constituents 
Although the average preference expressed by FASAC may constitute a useful starting 
point for the FASB to internalize constituent preferences in its agenda decision, it likely does not 
fully  capture  the  host  of  political  and  institutional  factors  likely  to  shape  the  balance  of 
constituent influence. Indeed, while an empirical test of H1 can provide strong evidence as to 
how  the  FASB  internalizes  general  consensus  opinions,  it  offers  little  insight  as  to  how 
disagreements  amongst  constituents  may  be  systematically  resolved.  In  particular  economic 
theory provides at least three potential forces which may be relevant to this setting. 
Informational Dependencies 
In deliberating, the FASB is only partially informed as to the economic and political 
consequences of policy decisions and, as such, are reliant on outside constituents to provide 
decision  relevant  information  (e.g.  Austen-Smith  1993).  The  information  provision  by 
constituents, however, is expected to be strategically self-serving and the extent to which it is 
weighted  in  FASB  agenda  decisions  will  likely  hinge  on  the  perceived  incentive-alignment 
between the interests of the FASB and the lobbying constituent  (Crawford and Sobel  1982,  
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Farrell 1995). Ex-ante the FASB’s ideological espousement of investors’ and creditors’ needs as 
paramount suggests a potentially strong alignment between the demands of financial constituents 
and FASB agenda decisions; financial constituents by construction are best suited to advise the 
FASB on decision relevance to users. However, these same constituents are often themselves 
preparers or may have perverse incentives to preserve personal information advantages and may 
not always lobby for greater accounting transparency. In similar vein, the FASB’s might rely on 
auditors, as technical accounting experts to provide insight to the pervasiveness of a problem, 
and  technical  feasibility  of  alternative  solutions  but  will  be  wary  of  auditors  incentives  to 
lobbying strategically in favor of their clients, or to maximize their own audit fees. Finally, 
preparers possess valuable information regarding the potential congruence between accounting 
practices  and  underlying  firm  economics,  practical  implementation  issues  and  economic 
consequences, but may lack credibility due to perceived incentives to avoid costs or to mislead 
providers of capital. Accordingly, the weighting of constituent preferences in FASB decisions is 
likely to reflect prevailing perceptions of each group’s credibility and may vary over time.  
Financial Dependencies 
Hall and Wayman (1990) argue that the impact of monetary contributions is most likely 
to manifest in influence at the agenda-setting stage of regulation. Although FASB members are 
not subject to election and therefore cannot be bought with campaign contributions, an average 
of 39% of the FASB’s operational funding prior to 2002 came from voluntary contributions 
made by auditors (in particular the Big N firms) and, to a lesser extent corporate preparers. If 
this  financial dependency  resulted in  preferential  access  to  policy  makers (e.g.  Aranson  and 
Hinich 1979, Austen-Smith 1995), or direct influence over policy outcomes (e.g. Austen-Smith  
14 
1987, Grossman and Helpman 2002) the preferences of auditors and preparers may manifest 
more prominently in FASB agenda decisions prior to the 2002 change in funding structure.  
Institutional Dependencies 
From its foundation, the FASB has afforded preferential institutional status to auditors in 
the  standard  setting  process.  Five  of  the  original  9  FAF  council  members  (who  are  jointly 
responsible for selecting FASB, FASAC and subsequent FAF members) were appointed by the 
AICPA.  Moreover,  the  AICPA  retained  standard  setting  authority  within  GAAP  hierarchy; 
Industry  and  Accounting  Guides,  Statements  of  Position  and  ACSEC  practice  bulletins  are 
designated  as  authoritative  guidance.  Likewise,  auditors  have  historically  enjoyed  greater 
representation  on  the  FASB,  averaging  3  seats  compared  to  1-2  for  preparers  and  0-1  for 
financial  representatives,  and  until  2010  all  FASB  Chairmen  were  former  auditors.  Such 
institutional prominence might manifest in systematic deference to auditors preferences.  
On the other hand, the FASB is institutionally beholden to the SEC and Congress, each of 
whom  has  effectual  veto  power  over  FASB  agenda  decisions.
12  Financial  constituents  may 
garner  significant  influence  over  the  FASB’s  agenda  by  transference  of  the  SEC  investor 
protection mandate. Moreover, Allen and Ramanna (2013) document a significant upward trend 
in the institutional presence of financial constituents on the FASB itself over time. Additionally, 
preparers have proven adept in lobbying Congress to alter regulatory outcomes using economic 
consequences arguments in later stages of standard setting (Zeff 1978, Ramanna 2008). At the 
agenda setting stage, however, considerable uncertainty exists regarding the eventual accounting 
solution  which  may  weaken  preparers’  ability  to  successfully  lobby.  Thus,  influence  at  the 
                                                            
12  In practice,  use  of  such  veto  power  is  rare,  potentially  reflecting  the  FASB’s  reluctance  in  equilibrium  to 
undertake projects where the perceived threat of regulatory intervention is high.   
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agenda setting stage is not necessarily predicted by evidence of regulatory success at later stages, 
and is an open empirical question. 
Aggregate Influence: 
The FASB assertion of “balance” in standard setting suggests that the distinct preferences 
of each of the FASB’s constituents should weigh significantly in its agenda decisions. On the 
other hand, as described above, informational, financial and institutional dependencies between 
the FASB and its constituents may create potential biases over time. Accordingly, hypothesis 
two is somewhat exploratory in nature and is constructed to provide evidence as to whether 
constituent influence appears to be broadly dispersed or is concentrated in the hands of only a 
few key players. H2 is stated formally in three parts below in terms of the alternatives. 
[H2] The probability that a topic will be added to the FASB’s technical agenda is 
increasing in the average project priority which FASAC members representing [a] 
auditor, [b] financial, and [c] preparer constituencies assign to that topic. 
Evidence in favor of all parts of H2 would be consistent with the FASB’s assertion of “balance” 
in standard setting, whereas evidence in favor of only one proposition might suggest a regulatory 
outcome which is partial to, or at the extreme captured by, certain constituencies.  
Although causal analysis is not feasible due to the constraints of a split sample, ex-ante, 
1982-2001 and 2002-2006 political dynamics are expected to differ. Around 2002, in the wake of 
public scrutiny and regulatory reforms motivated by a sequence of large accounting scandals, 
auditors  and  preparers  credibility  was  significantly  damaged.  Additionally,  responding  to 
concerns regarding conflicts of interest the Sarbanes Oxley Act §109 severed the financial ties 
between the FASB and Big N auditors by  establishing a mandatory fee system to fund the 
FASB’s operations. Finally, under intense scrutiny from both the SEC and Congress, the FASB 
voluntarily  undertook  structural  initiatives  intended  to  increase  the  structural  influence  of 
financial  users  including  establishment  of  the  Users  Advisory  Council  (UAC),  Investors  
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Technical Advisory Committee (ITAC), and Investors Task Force (ITF).
13 To the extent these 
changes significantly altered the political dynamics of FASB agenda decisions; I am more likely 
to find evidence in favor of  auditor and preparer influence in my 1982-2001 sample and of 
financial constituents in my 2002-2006 sample. 
2.3.3 Influence of large constituents 
Influencing the agenda likely necessitates the mobilization of resources both to become 
informed about agenda issues and to successfully lobby for preferred positions (Becker 1983, 
Austen-Smith 1987; 1993; 1995). It therefore intuitively follows that in the presence of intra-
constituent  disagreement  large  auditor,  preparer  and  financial  firms,  leveraging  superior 
financial resources, may have greater influence in the FASB’s agenda selections than do their 
smaller  counterparts.  Conditional  on  finding  significance  of  constituent  preferences  in  H2, 
hypothesis three is stated in three parts below in terms of the alternatives. 
[H3] The probability that a topic will be added to the FASB’s technical agenda is 
increasing in the average project priority FASAC members representing large [a] auditor, 
[b] financial, and [c] preparer constituencies assign to that topic, but is not significantly 
affected by the preferences of small constituents. 
Several  factors may temper this  prediction.  First, perhaps  in  response to  large firms’ 
perceived advantage with regard to influencing standards, the SEC’s (and by transference, the 
FASB’s)  fairness  objective  aims  to  protect  small  and/or  unsophisticated  financial  statement 
users.  The  FASB’s  explicitly  stated  objective  of  issuing  standards  that  improve  decision 
usefulness  may  be  similarly  intended  to  reduce  information  asymmetries  for  small  financial 
constituents  that  are  disadvantaged  relative  to  larger  users.  In  addition,  two  of  the  FASB’s 
founding organizations, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and 
                                                            
13 The UAC includes representatives from individual and institutional  investors, equity and debt analysts, lenders 
and credit rating agencies, the ITAC from the investment community with primary career focus on accounting and 
financial reporting matters, and the ITF from large institutional asset managers.  
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Securities  Industry  Association,  represent  the  interests  of  small  auditors  and  small  financial 
investors, respectively, and may provide effective channels of influence for these two groups.  
The  distinction  between  large  and  small  constituent  preferences  is  important  to  the 
FASB’s balancing objective. Small preparers, bearing disproportionately high implementation 
costs relative to their larger counterparts, may have a stronger preference for the status quo 
(Watts and Zimmerman 1978). Likewise small auditors, having higher relative learning costs, 
may be less likely than large accounting firms to favor accounting change (Puro 1984). Finally, 
small investors will tend to advocate for greater mandated disclosure than their informationally 
advantaged large financial counterparts, which may have strategic incentives to advocate for 
uninformative financial reports (Dye and Sridhar 2008).  Lev (1988) suggests that the FASB 
should prioritize the needs of small investors over those of large financial institutions to avoid 
the adverse capital market consequences of information inequity. 
3. Sample construction and variable measurement  
3.1 Sample construction: FASAC Survey on potential projects 
Table  1  summarizes  the  relevant  details  of  FASAC  Survey  content  and  participation 
between 1982 and 2006. FASAC members were surveyed about 242 potential agenda projects 
between 1982 and 2001. From 2002 to 2006, 81 potential projects were listed as being in the 
“Top 5” by FASAC or FASB members. These 323 projects constitute the primary sample for my 
analysis. Average participation in the survey is 79% and 82% for the 1982-2001 and 2002-2006 
periods, respectively, which translates into 6,221 unique Likert-scale project evaluations from 
1982 to 2001, and 2,159 unique open-ended binary evaluations (Top 5 or not) from 2002 to 
2006.  From  1998  to  2006,  FASB  members  were  also  included  in  the  FASAC  Survey,  and 
responded with a participation rate of 100%.   
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Copies of individual survey responses are not part of the public record and are protected 
by the terms of historical disclosure agreements with survey participants.
 Data on constituent 
preferences  is  obtained  from  annually  published  “Summaries  of  Responses  to  the  FASAC 
Survey”, on file in the FAF Public Archive in Norwalk, Connecticut.
14 From 2002 to 2006, 
individual level response data is reported in entirety in the Summar ies. From 1982 to 2001, 
however,  individual level data is  unpublished  for two  years  (1984 and 2001),  and in  the 
remaining sample is presented only for those participants who provided written comments in 
addition to Likert-score ratings.
15 As illustrated in  Table 1, 46% (2,926) of individual project 
evaluations are visible under this restriction.  
To understand the effect of missing data on my analysis,  Table 2 compares the available 
2,926  individual  responses by constituent group to the overall composition of FASAC.   The 
distribution of comments  across my sample  is similar to the   distribution  of total FASAC 
membership alleviating concern that the subsample composition differs systematically from the 
actual distribution of responses. Additionally, I manually compute the simple average of FASAC 
member Likert-ratings for which I have individual level data (commenting_fasac) and compare it 
to the true average Likert-rating across all respondents as reported in the Summary of Responses 
(average_fasac). The correlation between commenting_fasac and average_fasac is 0.85. 
3.2 Dependent variable: FASB agenda decision 
The dependent variable for my analysis is a binary variable (agenda_addt+1) that takes a 
value of 1 for each potential agenda project from the year t FASAC Survey that was added to the 
                                                            
14 No FASAC survey was conducted in 1988. The 1996 and 1997 Surveys did not address potential projects due to 
an “already full agenda.” No projects were added to the FASB’s agenda in 1997, and in 1998 additions were limited 
to two “limited scope projects”: “Technical Corrections” (SFAS 135) and “Motion Picture Films” (SFAS 139).  
15 The FASB was unable to provide an explanation for  historical variation in the presentation of FASAC survey 
results.  
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FASB’s technical agenda prior to the publication date of the t+1 FASAC Survey. Information on 
the timing of new project additions is obtained from the FASB’s “Technical Plan,” published 
quarterly as part of the FASB Status Report (later renamed the FASB Report), available through 
the AICPA library at the University of Michigan.  
3.3 Independent variables: FASAC member preferences 
3.3.1. Average FASAC preferences  
Average  FASAC  member  project  ratings  (average_fasac)  for  the  242  projects  in  my 
1982-2001 sample are reported in the respective Summaries of Responses. Standardization of 
average_fasac to account for variation in Likert-scale granularity is achieved as follows.   
                   
                    
          
          
In Eq. (1), average_fasacit is the un-scaled average rating assigned to project i in year t. 
LSmaxt is the maximum Likert-scale value used in year t and takes values {2, 3, 5, 8} across my 
sample,  as  shown  in  Table  1.
16  In the original  Surveys,  higher  Likert-scores  indicate  lower 
priority; for ease of interpretation Eq. (1) transforms average_fasacit such that fasac_prefit is 
increasing in the strength of average FASAC preference for a project, and is bounded [0,1]. 
From  2002  to  2006,  survey  respondents  mention  81  potential  projects  as  being  of  “Top  5” 
priority. Average FASAC priority (fasac_prefit) is calculated manually from the Summaries of 
Responses as the proportion of respondents that list project i in their “Top 5” for year t. 
                                                            
16 Because my  analyses regress FASB agenda decisions on  mean constituent preferences rather than individual 
responses, the noise introduced by rescaling is unlikely to systematically bias results. Untabulated analyses on a 
subset of years (1990-1995) for which granularity of responses is constant suggest robustness to this choice.   
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3.3.2. Average FASAC preference by constituent type  
Data on FASAC members’ professional affiliations is obtained from FAF annual reports 
(available from the FAF public archive) and manually merged with FASAC Survey Data. Using 
the  taxonomy  outlined  in  the  1988  FAF  annual  report,  FASAC  members  are  classified  as 
belonging  to  one  of  four  mutually  exclusive  groups  as  follows.  auditor  includes  members 
employed  in  the  public  accounting  profession.  financial  includes  members  employed  in  the 
banking, insurance, or securities industry. preparer includes members of industry not classified 
as  auditor  or  financial.  other  includes  academics,  attorneys,  non-profit,  and  government 
representatives. 
Analogous to the construction of aggregate FASAC member preferences (fasac_prefit), 
individual FASAC member preferences for the 1982-2001 sample are rescaled to a range of [0, 
1] which is increasing in members’ reported priority for project addition. Re-scaled individual 
preferences  are  then  averaged  across  each  constituent  group  to  generate  four  variables: 
aud_prefit,  fin_prefit,  prep_prefit,  and  other_prefit  which  reflect  average  auditor,  financial, 
preparer, and other FASAC member preferences, respectively, for project i in year t. For 2002-
2006, aud_prefit, fin_prefit, prep_prefit and other_prefit are computed as the proportion of each 
constituency who listed a project i in her top 5 in year t. As discussed in Section 3.1 data on 
individual preferences are unavailable for 1984 and 2001 (26 projects) and an additional 30 
projects are excluded due to missing individual level data for at least one constituent group. After 
exclusions, 186 (81) potential projects remain from 1982 to 2001 (2002 to 2006) for testing H2. 
3.3.3. Large versus small constituents 
FASAC members classified as auditor, financial, and preparer are further segregated as 
representing large and small institutions as follows. big_aud is constructed as the average project  
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priority of members employed by Big N audit firms (Big 8, 6, 5, and 4, respectively, over time). 
big_fin  is  constructed  as  the  average  project  priority  of  members  employed  by  commercial 
banks, investment management firms, investment banks, insurance companies, or private equity 
firms with total assets greater than or equal to the total assets of the 20
th largest bank holding 
company (BHC), as reported in the Bank Regulatory database, for each year in my sample. The 
Big 2 rating agencies are also classified as big_fin. Appendix B lists the total asset cutoff values 
used for each year as well as the member organizations represented on FASAC that fall above 
and below these cutoffs.
17 big_prep is constructed as the average project priority of members 
employed by Fortune 500 companies. little_aud, little_fin, and little_prep are constructed as the 
complements of big_aud, big_fin, and big_prep, respectively.
18  
From the sample of 186 (81) projects available for testing H2, an  additional 100 (0) 
projects, for which no individual data on the preferences of at least one disaggregated constituent 
group is visible in the Summary of R esponses, must be excluded from my sample . After data 
limitations, 94 (81) potential projects remain from 1982 to 2001 (2002 to 2006) for testing H3. 
3.4 Control variables 
3.4.1 FASB member ex-ante project priorities 
From  1998  to  2006,  the  FASAC  Survey  polled  FASB  members  directly  and  their 
preferences  are  reported  in  the  Summaries  of  Responses.  Accordingly,  for  my  2002-2006 
sample, FASB member priorities can be controlled for explicitly. Analogous to the construction 
                                                            
17 There is no standard definition of “big finance” in the literature and, ex-ante, any separating criteria is necessarily 
arbitrary. Ex-post however, a clear distinction is apparent between large and small firms for each finance industry 
represented in my sample and is captured appropriately by the total assets cutoff employed herein. See Appendix B.  
18 little_aud includes the AICPA member representative, and little_fin includes the SIFMA member representative.   
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of fasac_pref for this period (see Eq. (1)), fasb_pref is constructed as the proportion of FASB 
members that rated project i as a “Top 5” priority in year t.  
For my 1982-2001 sample, I construct a binary variable (fasb_proxy) based on a manual 
review of FASB Status reports for mention of potential agenda projects. Quarterly, the FASB 
provides a partial listing of “other issues” it has “received requests to consider” for its future 
agenda. The listing is “not intended to be comprehensive”; in 1988, for example, the FASB 
screened nearly 100 potential projects (FAF 1988), but only eight are mentioned in that year’s 
Status  Reports.  Accordingly,  I  interpret  the  choice  of  issues  mentioned  as  an  ex-ante 
manifestation  of  which  projects  were,  at  an  early  stage,  viewed  by  the  FASB  as  stronger 
potential candidates for its agenda. Conversations with prior Board members and staff confirm 
the  reasonableness  of  this  assumption.  fasb_proxyit  is  coded  1  for  each  potential  project  i 
mentioned in the four quarterly Status Reports preceding the year t FASAC Survey. 
To  judge  the  validity  of  fasb_proxy  I  compare  it  to  the  explicit  measures  of  FASB 
member  preferences  available  in  the  Summaries  of  Responses  from  1998  to  2006.  The 
correlation between fasb_proxy (binary) and fasb_pref (continuous) is 0.47 (p-value 0.004) for 
1998  to  2001  and  0.36  (p-value  0.001)  for  2002  to  2006.  Additionally,  to  ensure  that  my 
construct  is  meaningful  but  not  mechanical,  I  examine  the  univariate  relationship  between 
fasb_proxy and my dependent variable (agenda_add). The odds of agenda inclusion increase by 
24% (p-value <.001) when fasb_proxy is equal to 1; 7(29%) of 24 projects for which fasb_proxy 
is equal to 1 are subsequently added to the Board’s agenda versus only 11(5%) of 218 projects 
when fasb_proxy is equal to 0.  
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3.4.2 SEC project priorities 
The SEC holds statutory standard-setting authority from Congress, but has voluntarily 
delegated  responsibility  for  the  promulgation  of  accounting  standards  to  the  FASB. 
Notwithstanding, the SEC retains close review liaison. The SEC Chief Accountant regularly 
attends FASAC meetings and may suggest topics for inclusion on the FASB’s agenda. During 
his ten years as chairman of the FASB, Dennis Beresford noted that SEC suggestions were most 
often  at  the  level  of  practice  problems,  which  were  handled  by  the  EITF;  however,  in  the 
“relatively rare” case the SEC became involved with its technical agenda, the FASB considered 
it  “very  seriously.”
19  To  control  for  this  potential  influence,  I  construct  a  proxy  for  SEC 
preferences (sec_proxy) based on a review of all quarterly FASAC meeting minutes (during 
which  the  SEC  Chief  Accountant  makes  a  presentation)  and  the  SEC  Annual  Reports’ 
“Accounting  Matters”  section.
20  sec_proxy  is  coded  1  for  any  potential  project  discussed 
favorably by the SEC during the 12 months that directly precede or follow the FASAC annual 
survey.  
3.4.3 International accounting convergence  
In 1991, the FASB committed to actively consider International Accounting Standards in 
the  development  of  its  own  projects,  and  since  2002  has  actively  pursued  the  objective  of 
convergence. Accordingly, FASB project selection may be influenced by the concurrent agenda 
of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB, formerly IASC), which may itself be 
influenced differentially by the preferences of its  broad constituent base. To control for this 
possibility, I construct a dummy variable (iasbit) that is set equal to one if there exists a project to 
                                                            
19 Personal phone interview with Dennis Beresford on 7/26/2012 about his experiences as chairman of the FASB 
from 1987-1997 
20 FASAC meeting minutes are available through the FAF public archives, SEC annual reports online at sec.gov.  
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address issue i on the IASB’s (IASC’s) agenda during the 12 months preceding or following the 
year  t  FASAC  Survey  or  if  issue  i  is  included  in  a  previously  issued  memorandum  of 
understanding between the FASB and IASB.
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4. Descriptive statistics and multivariate research design 
4.1 Descriptive statistics   
Table 3, Panel A provides summary statistics for my dependent variable. Eighteen (7.4%) 
of the 242 potential projects in my 1982-2001 sample, and seven (8.6%) of the 81 potential 
projects in my 2002-2006 sample, are subsequently added to the board’s agenda. These low 
proportions  are  consistent  with  the  FASB’s  assertion  that  they  screen  “far  more  [proposed 
agenda topics] than we can possibly accommodate” (FAF 1988).  
Table 3, Panel B provides summary statistics for my independent variables. From 1982 to 
2001,  the  mean  values  for  fasac_pref,  aud_pref,  user_pref,  prep_pref,  big_aud,  little_aud, 
big_fin, little_fin, big_prep, and little_prep are in the range of 0.34-0.55, suggesting that the 
board’s  primary  constituents  favor  adding  just  under  half  of  the  projects  proposed  on  the 
FASAC’s annual survey. Lower average priority is assigned to potential projects by preparers 
than  by  any  other  constituency  (t-test  p-values  <0.01),  consistent  with  the  argument  that 
preparers are more likely to favor the status quo. Panel B also reveals that Big N auditors 
(big_aud)  and  financial  constituents,  regardless  of  size  (big_fin  and  little_fin),  give  more 
favorable assessments to potential projects than do other constituent groups. This may reflect ex-
ante Big N auditor and finance industry influence on the selection of potential projects included 
                                                            
21 Information on the IASB’s (IASC’s) technical agenda prior to 2001 is obtained from Camfferman and Zeff (2007) 
and post 2001 compiled from the IASB Updates available through ifrs.org.   
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on the FASAC Survey, or simply that, on average, these groups view any change in accounting 
standards more favorably.  
Pearson correlations between the explanatory variables in Table 3, Panel B are shown in 
Table 3, Panel C. From 1982 to 2001, correlations between constituent groups’ priorities are 
generally low, consistent  with  a high degree of variation  in constituent incentives  regarding 
financial  reporting  standards.  The  highest  observed  correlations  are  between  big_prep  and 
little_prep (.65); and big_aud and little_aud (.43). Interestingly the corre1lation between big_fin 
and little_fin is low (.14) consistent with the argument the preference of large financial firms 
may not align with the needs of small users (Dye and Sridhar 2008, Lev 1998). Correlations 
between all explanatory variables are higher in the 2002-2006 sample than in the 1982-2001 
sample.  In  particular  Table  3,  Panel  C  reveals  a  particularly  high  correlation  (.65)  between 
preparer and financial industry preferences in this period which appears largely driven by the 
alignment of large financial firms (big_fin) with preparers (big_prep and little_prep).
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4.2 Multivariate research design 
Although there are no formal constraints on the number of projects the FASB can add to 
its technical agenda, time and resource constraints impose practical limits on the number of 
potential projects that can be undertaken simultaneously. Thus, agenda decisions in any given 
year t may be jointly determined. To address intra-cluster correlation I estimate the conditional 
probability of yit on other outcomes from the same cluster (i.e., the set of yjt) using a conditional 
fixed effects model (e.g. Pendergast et al. 1996).  
The formal specifications for my regressions are given by Equations (4)-(6) below: 
                                                            
22 To assess the impact of high correlations on multivariate regression analysis, variance inflation factors (VIFs) 
were computed for all regressions. Without exception VIF’s are <10, alleviating multicollinearity concerns.   
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In Eq. (4)-(6), i is a potential project included on the year t annual FASAC Survey and 
    and     are the mean intercept and slope parameters, respectively, for cluster t. Standard 
errors are clustered by year. Results are reported both with and without controls for FASB and 
SEC  preferences  (Wit).  Conditional  fixed-effect  estimation  requires  variation  in  the  outcome 
variable within each cluster (t); years in which no potential projects from the FASAC Survey are 
subsequently added to the Board’s agenda will be excluded from estimation of model parameters 
resulting in diminished sample size.
23 For comparison all results are presented using both the full 
sample (unconditional logit) and the conditional sample (fixed effects logit), however, more 
weight should be placed on the results of conditional specification.
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5. Results 
5.1 Influence of aggregate FASAC preference on the FASB’s agenda 
Table 4, Panels A and B report regression results on the responsiveness of FASB agenda 
decisions to average FASAC member preferences for my 1982-2001 and 2002-2006 samples, 
respectively. Of the six columns in each of the panels in Table 4, columns (1), (3), and (5) are 
                                                            
23 No potential projects from the FASAC annual surveys for 1983, 1984, 1986, 1989, 1990, 1992, 1998, and 2006 
were added to the FASB’s technical agenda during the following year.  
24 An alternative to address intra -cluster correlation is to use a random effec ts model which preserves data from 
clusters without dependent variable variation by imposing the  assumption of  orthogonality between the cluster 
parameter and the explanatory variables. In my setting, there are numerous omitted year trend variables likely  to 
violate this assumption including the FASB’s annual budget, the number, scope, and estimated horizon of projects 
currently  on  the  agenda,  and  public  sentiment  regarding  the  issue  of  “standards  overload.”  For  this  reason,  a 
conditional fixed effects model is more appropriate; however all results are robust to a random effects specification.   
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estimated using a simple logit model with year-cluster robust standard errors, columns (2), (4), 
and (6) using a conditional year-fixed effect logit model. For both estimation models, regressions 
are presented first without controls, then with only FASB controls, and lastly with FASB, SEC 
and  IASB  controls.  Simple  logit  coefficients  are  estimated  on  the  full  sample  of  242  (81) 
potential projects from the 1982-2001 (2002-2006) FASAC Surveys. The sample size is reduced 
to 143 (67) for conditional fixed effect estimation. 
In aggregate, the results from Table 4, Panels A and B provide support for the hypothesis 
that FASB agenda decisions are responsive to constituent preferences, as proxied by FASAC 
member  responses.  Across  all  model  specifications  and  both  samples,  FASAC  priority 
(fasac_pref) is significant with and without the inclusion of controls. As expected, fasb_proxy is 
also significant across all specifications in the 1982-2001 regressions as is fasb_pref using 2002-
2006  data;  sec_proxy  and  iasb  are  significant  from  1982-2001,  but  not  from  2002-2006. 
Converting the coefficients from Panel A (B) column (6) to odds ratios indicates that a change of 
one standard deviation, 0.16 (0.11), in average FASAC priority increases the likelihood of a 
project’s addition to the subsequent year’s agenda by a factor of 1.66 (3.21).  Collectively, the 
results from Table 4, suggest that constituent preferences are an important input to FASB agenda 
decisions, incremental to FASB members ex-ante ideological preferences.   
5.2 Influence of auditor, financial, and preparer preferences on the FASB's agenda  
Table 5, Panels A and B present regression results on the responsiveness of FASB agenda 
decisions to auditor, financial, preparer, and other FASAC member preferences for the 1982-
2001 and 2002-2006 periods, respectively. Owing to individual level data restrictions discussed 
in Section 3.1, sample size is reduced to 186 for simple logit and 111 for conditional logit 
estimation in Panel A. Table 5 is otherwise identical in all respects to Table 4.   
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Table 5, Panel A provides evidence that from 1982 to 2001, both auditor and financial 
constituent preferences had significant influence on the FASB’s agenda; aud_pref and fin_pref 
are positive and statistically significant across all specifications. Consistent with auditors having 
financial  and  institutional  advantages  during  this  period,  auditor  preferences  appear  more 
impactful than financial preferences. Conversion of the coefficients in Table 4, column (6) to 
odds ratios suggests that a project’s probability of agenda inclusion is increased by 87% by a one 
standard deviation (0.16) increase in auditor priority, but only by 41% by an equivalent increase 
in financial representatives’ priority; the difference is significant (p-value = 0.025).  
Table 5, Panel B presents results of the regression analysis from 2002 to 2006. In contrast 
to the results reported in Panel A, there is no evidence to suggest that average auditor priority 
(aud_pref)  is  related  to  the  FASB’s  agenda  decisions  during  this  period.  Instead,  financial 
constituents’ preferences (fin_pref) alone appear significant across all specifications consistent 
with the temporal rise in financial sector influence documented in Allen and Ramanna (2013). 
Computing the odds ratios for column (6) suggests that a one standard deviation increase in the 
proportion of financial representatives who rank a project in their top 5 increases the likelihood 
of agenda admission by a factor of 9.8. Notably, I find no evidence of preparer (prep_pref) 
influence on the FASB’s selection of agenda projects in either Panel A or Panel B, in contrast 
with  research  on  later  stages  of  standard  setting  that  has  documented  significant  preparer 
influence. 
5.3 Influence of large and small constituent preferences on the FASB’s agenda 
Table  6,  Panel  A  and  Panel  B  report  for  the  1982-2001  and  2002-2006  samples, 
respectively, the results of regression tests on constituent preferences disaggregated into “large” 
and  “small”  institutions  (big_aud  and  little_aud,  big_fin  and  little_fin,  and  big_prep  and  
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little_prep). Based on the visibility of individual level data, sample size is reduced to 94 for 
simple  logit  and  52  for  conditional  logit  estimation  in  the  1982-2001  sample.  Table  6  is 
otherwise identical to Table 5.  
As hypothesized, Table 6, Panel A suggests that the significant coefficient on aud_pref in 
Table 5, Panel A is attributable to the influence of Big N audit firms; big_aud is significant and 
little_aud  insignificant  across  all  regression  specifications.  Odds  ratios  suggest  that  a  one 
standard  deviation  increase  in  average  Big  N  auditor  preferences  (big_aud)  increases  the 
likelihood of agenda addition by a factor of 2.1. When disaggregated, the significant coefficient 
on  financial constituents’  preferences observed in  Table 5 is  present  for  neither  big_fin  nor 
little_fin, making it difficult to assess conclusively what impact, if any, financial constituents had 
on  the  FASB’s  agenda  during  this  period.  As  in  Table  5,  preparer  priorities  (big_prep  and 
little_prep) are not significant. 
Table 6, Panel B shows the significant fin_pref estimate for 2002-2006, reported in Table 
5,  Panel  B,  may  be  driven  by  both  the  influence  of  large  and  small  financial  constituents, 
inconsistent with H3[b]. The estimates for little_fin and big_fin are of similar magnitude and are 
significant  most  specifications.  This  result  is  surprising  when  the  financial  and  political 
advantages of large financial institutions are considered, but may be consistent with the FASB’s 
fairness objective and with SEC emphasis on the needs of smaller investors.  
Taken  together,  the  results  of  Tables  5  and  6  are  consistent  with  the  premise  that 
regulatory and institutional changes accompanying the accounting scandals of the early 2000s 
substantially impacted the relationship between the FASB’s agenda decisions and constituent 
preferences.  Specifically,  prior  to  2002,  consistent  with  auditors  having  institutionalized 
structural and financial advantages during this period, Big N audit firms appear to have dominant  
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influence over FASB agenda decisions. Post 2002, in the absence of these advantages auditor 
influence  is  attenuated  and  instead  financial  constituents  appear  to  command  the  prevailing 
advisory  role.  If  financial  constituents  are  taken  as  synonymous  with  users  this  findings  is 
consistent with the stated intent of regulatory and institutional initiatives to bolster the primacy 
of  user  interests  in  standard  setting.  On  the  other  hand,  if  financial  constituents  lobby  as 
preparers  or  strategically  as  informationally  advantaged  market  participants  (e.g.  Dye  and 
Sridhar 2008), the ascendency of financial firm preferences may not necessarily benefit users.  
6. Additional Tests 
6.1 Financial firm expertise 
The informational expertise of financial constituents is likely to be particularly relevant 
to FASB decisions when the agenda project being contemplated is financially topical.  Thus, 
controlling for the underlying subject matter of agenda projects may be critical to ascertaining 
the true influence of financial constituents, and might also help explain the increasing influence 
of  financial  constituents  if  the  FASB  contemplated  more  financial  projects  post  2002.    To 
investigate this possibility, I create a dummy variable (fin_issue) to capture proposed agenda 
topics  dealing  with  debt,  investments,  financial  instruments,  leasing  or  financial  institutions.  
Summary statistics reveal that the proportion of proposed agenda projects pertaining to financial 
transactions is not substantially different across my two samples; 24% and 21% of proposed 
agenda topics address financial transactions in my 1982 to 2001 and 2002 to 2006 samples, 
respectively. Thus, the subject mix of proposed projects is unlikely to explain the ascendancy of 
financial firm influence over time.  Table 7 presents the results of re-estimating columns (6) of 
Table  5  panels  A  and  B  after  including  controls  fin_issue  and  an  interaction  term 
(fin_pref*fin_issue).  As seen in Table 7, Column (1) for 1982 to 2001 sample, fin_issue and  
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fin_pref*fin_issue do not load significant.  By contrast, for the 2002 to 2006 sample (Column 2) 
fin_pref*fin_issue is positive and highly significant as is fin_pref and suggesting that financial 
constituents’ influence is accentuated for, but not limited to financial agenda proposals.  Thus, 
while there is evidence that financial constituents influence on FASB agenda decisions varies 
predictably with subject matter expertise, this expertise appears to be a relevant factor only post-
2002.  From 1982-2001, auditor preferences alone appear significant, consistent with the results 
in Tables 5 and 6. 
6.2 Preparer preference heterogeneity 
For any potential project, only a subset of preparers may be affected (Leftwich 1995). 
Accordingly,  an  alternative  explanation  for  the  lack  of  significance  of  preparer  preferences 
across my regressions is that aggregated preparer preferences are a poor proxy for the political 
pressure exerted by a small subset of influential preparers on any given issue. Given the limited 
visibility  of  political  maneuvering  at  the  agenda  setting  stage,  my  analysis  cannot 
comprehensively  address  this  concern;  my  vantage  is  limited  to  the  preferences  of  those 
preparers represented on the FASAC. However, some evidence can be obtained by re-estimating 
Table  5  regressions  using  the  priority  ratings  of  the  Financial  Executives  Institute  (FEI) 
representative in place of average preparer preference. The FEI is one of the FASB’s sponsoring 
organizations and has been active across the FASB’s history in lobbying for preparer interests 
(e.g., Van Riper 1994). FEI preferences are available for a subsample of 117 (81) projects from 
1982 to 2001 (2002 to 2006). Untabulated results obtained from these subsamples are consistent 
with  those  reported  in  Table  5;  the  coefficient  on  FEI  remains  insignificant  across  all 
specifications.   
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6.3 Media influence 
Although the financial press generally shows little interest in the FASB’s activities, the 
media has in specific instances actively engaged in discussion of a proposed accounting standard 
(e.g., stock options, pensions). In such instances, heightened media coverage may increase public 
policy pressure and influence regulators’ decisions. If this is the case, and if media attention is 
systematically correlated with the preferences of a particular constituent group, failure to control 
for  media  pressure  could  lead  to  biased  inferences  in  my  primary  analysis.  Accordingly,  I 
construct a control variable, media_coverageit, which is equal to the raw number of articles in the 
Wall Street Journal and Financial Times during the 12 months preceding each FASAC Survey 
returned by a Factiva search for the key words FASB (or Financial Accounting Standards Board) 
plus a set  of terms  specific to  each potential topic  i, scaled by the total  number of articles 
published over the same period. When included in regression analysis, media_coverage does not 
load significant, nor does its inclusion substantively change the results reported in Tables 4-6. 
7. Conclusion 
Motivated by theoretical literature in economics and political science that suggests that 
determination  of  a  regulatory  agenda  will  have  significant  economic  consequences  for  the 
regulated, I examine the significance of auditor, preparer, and financial constituent preferences 
in the determination of the FASB’s technical agenda. Data on constituent preferences is obtained 
by  leveraging  a  unique  institutional  feature  of  the  FASB’s  agenda  process,  namely,  formal 
consultation with an advisory council (FASAC) deliberately structured to represent the Board’s 
broader constituency in “microcosm.” Disaggregated survey data on FASAC member priority 
ratings from the FASAC Annual Survey for 323 potential projects considered between 1981 and  
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2006 provide an opportunity to view the contemporaneous preferences of constituents that are 
otherwise archivally opaque at the agenda setting stage.  
Key findings of my analysis are that constituent priorities are a significant determinant of 
the FASB’s project selections, and that prior to 2002 influence is concentrated among only a few 
players,  namely,  “Big  N”  audit  firms.  Post  2002,  potentially  congruent  with  the  intent  of 
institutional  changes  designed  to  sever  financial  and  institutional  dependencies  between  the 
FASB and the large audit firms, as well to as increase participation of financial statement users 
in  standard  setting,  Big  N  audit  firms’  priorities  no  longer  appear  to  dominate  the  FASB’s 
agenda  decision.  Instead,  results  from  2002  to  2006  suggest  that  the  priorities  of  financial 
constituents weigh most heavily in agenda decisions. Contrary to prior literature that examines 
later stages of accounting standard setting, I find no evidence to suggest significant influence on 
the  part  of  industrial  preparers  in  agenda  setting.  Results  of  my  analysis  are  robust  to  the 
inclusion of FASB member ex-ante agenda preferences, SEC project priorities, and year-fixed 
effects.  
Broadly, this paper affords a preliminary look at an important dynamic in the political 
economy of US GAAP: the role of constituents in determining the FASB’s technical agenda. 
Given the far-reaching economic impacts of financial accounting standards, the existence and 
power of forces that influence the selection of topics to be addressed have strong implications for 
the potential redistributive consequences of accounting standard setting. Although the limitations 
embedded in a secondary survey analysis do not enable me to establish conclusively whether the 
concentration of power in agenda setting shifted around 2002 as a direct result of the host of 
reforms  designed  to  bolster  the  FASB’s  financial  independence  and/or  increase  financial 
constituent  participation,  my  results  highlight  that  a  shift  has  occurred.  Future  research  that  
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disentangles the effects of various structural and regulatory reforms could shed light on which 
changes played the greatest role in effecting this change.  
Future work in agenda setting can explore additional factors that might influence the 
FASB’s agenda including the relative influence of public sentiment, accounting scandals, and 
economic cycles on the quantity and content of topics selected. Although aggregate FASAC 
preferences likely reflect contemporaneous economic and political forces, the direct effect of 
such forces merit separate investigation. To what extent, for example, do regulators over-react or 
under-react in the face of public criticism blaming undesirable economic consequences on poorly 
crafted accounting regulation? Investigating the influence of constituents after a topic has been 
added to the Board’s agenda (where my study ends) but before a discussion memorandum or 
exposure draft is issued (where the majority of existing literature begins) constitutes another 
avenue for future research. Among the questions that merit exploration are how the universe of 
alternative  solutions  to  an  accounting  problem  are  identified  and  vetted,  and  what  forces 
influence the FASB’s original position, project scope, and timeline.  
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Appendix A: Illustrative excerpts from the 1998 and 2002 FASAC Surveys and associated 
Summaries of Responses. 
From 1982-2001 the annual FASAC Survey provided a list of potential projects for addition to 
the Board’s agenda and asked respondents to score each topic according to a pre-defined Likert 
Scale. Participant responses to the Survey were subsequently presented to Board members in a 
document entitled “Summary of Responses to the Annual FASAC Survey” (hereafter Summary 
of Responses) that reported both average participant ratings as well as individual responses.  
From 2002-2006 the annual FASAC Survey did not provide a list of potential projects but rather 
asked participants to write in the five projects they felt were most important for the Board to 
include on its agenda. Individual responses to the Survey as well as a tally of “Top-5” mentions 
afforded to each project were subsequently presented to Board members in the Summary of 
Responses.  
Excerpts from the 1998 and 2002 FASAC Surveys and Summaries of Responses are provided in 
this appendix for illustrative purposes.  
Illustrative excerpts from 1998 
FASAC Survey instructions  
“The Board and staff receive many requests and suggestions to add items to the agenda from 
various sources, including FASAC, the AICPA, and the SEC, among others… This section asks 
your views on which subjects—if any—the Board should consider for addition to its agenda. The 
Board  also  would  be  interested  in  other  topics,  not  listed,  that  you  believe  should  be 
addressed…Please evaluate the topics in this section on a scale of 1 to 5, with “1” being the 
highest priority and “5” the lowest. A score of “1” would indicate… respondents are [also] 
encouraged to comment [qualitatively]” 
 
Summary of Responses  
“Comments provided by respondents about possible future agenda projects are detailed below.  
 
1.  Accounting for Intangible Assets 
The average score by group of respondent is as follows 
Council Members    2.94 
Board Members    2.38 
 
Comments provided by respondents and the score assigned by each were: 
Ciesielski (1) There is a need for the project. There have been problems in this 
area  for  30-plus  years…Highest  priority  because  (1)  existing 
accounting is producing balance sheets that are not particularly 
meaningful… 
…   
Woodyatt (4)  Worthwhile  subject  but  should  wait  for  decisions  on  business 
combinations project”  
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Illustrative excerpts from 2002 
FASAC Survey instructions  
“The current financial reporting environment is one of uncertainty and transition affected by, 
among  other  things,  corporate  bankruptcies,  accounting  irregularities,  and  legislation  to 
regulate the accounting profession. Given that environment, we think it is appropriate to begin 
the 2002 annual FASAC survey with a blank piece of paper. If the FASB was setting its agenda 
today, what are the five most important issues the Board should address? Please be as specific 
as possible and give the reasons for your response.”  
 
Summary of Responses  
“The table below summarizes the five issues that appeared most often in Council members’ 
responses. Board member responses are shown for comparison…” 
 
   
“Individual responses appear below. We have included a brief reference to the issues cited by 
the respondent, followed by more detailed comments (if any) on each issue. 
 
Anderson    Revenue Recognition 
      Financial Performance Reporting 
      Cash Flow Reporting 
      Disclosures about Intangibles 
      Accounting for Leases 
 
Revenue recognition is a central accounting issue and the literature on 
revenue recognition has become inadequate as a result of… 
… 
Wulff     Simplification and Codification 
      Reporting Financial Performance 
      Revenue Recognition 
      Fair Value Measurement 
      ST International Convergence 
 
Simplification  and  Codification:  transitioning  to  principles-based 
standards…”    
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Appendix B: Classification of financial FASAC into large and small constituencies by total 
assets.  
Panel A: Total Assets Cutoff Value for big_fin by year (in $millions) 
 
Panel B: Commenting FASAC member financial institutions  
   
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
2,746    2,761    3,474    3,791    4,608    4,023    4,618    4,975    5,770    6,645    6,708  
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
7,633    11,022   12,272   12,676   13,860   14,817   22,634   24,908   25,456   25,142  
little_fin
Bear Stearns & Co. 1989 -1992 Grace & White Inc. 1979 -1983
Goldman Sachs & Co. 1998 -2001 SoundView Financial Group 1993 -1994
Bear Stearns & Co. 2002 -2005 Harris Investment Management 1995 -1998
J.P.Morgan Chase & Co. 2002 -2005 Aubrey G. Lanston & Co. 2001 -2004
Capital Group 2003 -2006 William Blair & Co. 2003 -2006
Putnam Investments 2004 -2007
Irving Trust Co. 1980 -1983 Florida National S&L 1980 -1983
Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. 1982 -1983 United Virginia Bank 1981 -1985
Wachovia Bank 1983 -1987 Astoria Federal S&L 1987 -1990
Norwest Corp. 1985 -1986 Grundy National Bank 1989 -1992
Citicorp 1985 -1988 Boston Savings Bank 1991 -1994
First National Bank of Boston 1987 -1990 Grundy National Bank 1992 -1995
BankAmerica Corp. 1989 -1992 Andover Bancorp 1993 -1996
National Westminster Bank 1992 -1995 People's Bank 1995 -1998
First Chicago Corp. 1993 -1996 Patelco Credit Union 2003 -2006
Chase Manhattan Bank 1993 -1996
Bank of Boston 1996 -1999
GE Capital 1999 -2002
Wells Fargo Bank 2006 -2009
Warburg Pincus 2006 -2009 Greenspan O'Neil Associates 1985 -1988
Crabtree Ventures 2001 -2004
Lincoln National Corp. 1988 -1991 New England Mutual Life 1983 -1987
Aetna Life & Casualty 1992 -1995
C.N.A Financial 1993 -1996
US Steel and Carnegie Pension 1993 -1996
Moody's  1999 -2002 Duff & Phelps 1989 -1992
Standard & Poors 2003 -2006 Duff & Phelps 1996 -1999
Moody's  2005 -2008
*Post the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999 financial holding companies may engage in both investment banking 
and commercial banking activities
Private Equity/Venture Capital
Insurance
Pension Fund
Rating Agency
big_fin 
Investment Banking/Management*
Commercial Banking/Bank Holding Company* 
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Figure 1: FASAC composition by constituent group 
auditor is defined as any member currently employed in the public accounting profession, financial as any member 
currently  employed  in  the  banking,  insurance,  or  securities  industry,  preparer  as  any  member  of  business  and 
industry not classified as auditor or user, and other as any member who does not fall into the category of auditor, 
financial, or preparer. See Section 3.3.2 for details. 
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Table 1: Summary of response data for the FASAC Annual Questionnaire on the Projects 
and Priorities of the FASB 
 
Panel A: 1982-2001: Priority ratings of prompted topics for future agenda inclusion 
 
Panel B: 2002-2006: Free Response top 5 priorities for future agenda projects 
 
Year ^
Potential 
Projects 
Included
Scale 
Granularity # FASAC
Unique 
Project 
Evaluations
1982 6 [1,3] 37 33 (89%) 198 No 79 (40%)
1983 6 [1,3] 39 35 (90%) 210 No 86 (41%)
1984 # 7 [1,3] 37 29 (78%) 203 No 0 (0%)
1985 6 [1,2] 38 28 (74%) 168 No 81 (48%)
1986 12 [1,2] 33 28 (85%) 336 No 123 (37%)
1987 18 [1,2] 29 23 (79%) 414 No 132 (32%)
1989 20 [1,2] 33 27 (82%) 540 No 172 (32%)
1990 21 [8,1] 32 27 (84%) 567 No 275 (49%)
1991 21 [1,8] 33 28 (85%) 588 No 312 (53%)
1992 23 [1,8] 32 22 (69%) 506 No 231 (46%)
1993 23 [1,8] 32 26 (81%) 598 No 394 (66%)
1994 23 [1,8] 32 27 (84%) 621 No 404 (65%)
1995 20 [1,8] 31 26 (84%) 520 No 373 (72%)
1998 10 [1,5] 33 18 (55%) 180 Yes (100%) 161 (89%)
1999 7 [1,5] 31 22 (71%) 154 Yes (100%) 103 (67%)
2001 # 19 [1,3] 33 22 (67%) 418 Yes (100%) 0 (0%)
Total 242 421 (79%) 6221 2926 (46%)
FASAC Responding
 Visible Individual 
Ratings
FASB 
Responding
^ Data with which to construct my variable for aggregate FASAC preferences (FASAC_pref) during the 1982-
2001 period are unavailable for four years: 1988 (no FASAC survey); 1996 and 1997 (FASAC survey did not 
address “Potential Agenda Items”); 2000 (survey respondents ranked rather than independently rated 
projects). # Data with which to construct my variables for disaggregated FASAC preferences by constituent group 
(aud_pref, fin_pref, and ind_pref) are unavailable for two years: in 1984 and 2001, individual qualitative 
responses, but not quantitative ratings, are visible in the Summary of FASAC Annual Survey Responses.
Year
Potential 
Projects 
Mentioned
Scale 
Granularity # FASAC
Unique 
Project 
Mentions
2002 20 Top 5 33 22 (67%) 440 Yes (100%) Yes (100%)
2003 16 Top 5 33 27 (82%) 432 Yes (100%) Yes (100%)
2004 16 Top 5 35 28 (80%) 448 Yes (100%) Yes (100%)
2005 15 Top 5 32 27 (84%) 405 Yes (100%) Yes (100%)
2006 14 Top 5 32 31 (97%) 434 Yes (100%) Yes (100%)
Total 81 135 (82%) 2159 2159 (100%)
FASAC Responding
 Individual Top 5 
Visible
FASB 
Responding 
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Table 2: Distribution of FASAC Survey commenting members and total FASAC member 
composition (1982-2001) 
Sample is the 2926 individual survey responses visible in the Summary of Responses to the 1982-2001 FASAC 
annual surveys (see Section 3.1) auditor is defined as any member currently employed in the public accounting 
profession, financial as any member currently employed in the banking, insurance, or securities industry, preparer 
as any member of business and industry not classified as auditor or user, and other as any member who does not fall 
into the category of auditor, financial, or preparer. See Section 3.3.2 for details. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Auditor 812 28% Auditor 8 24%
Preparer 813 28% Preparer 9 27%
Financial 784 27% Financial 10 30%
Others 517 18% Others 6 18%
Total 2926 100% Total 33 100%
Distribution of Visible Individual 
Response Data by Constituent Group
Average Annual Distribution of All 
FASAC Members by Constituent Group 
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Table 3 Summary statistics and Pearson correlation coefficients 
Sample is 343 potential projects about which FASAC member preferences were collected in the 1982-2006 FASAC annual surveys. agenda_add is a binary 
variable that takes the value of 1 for potential projects added to the FASB’s agenda within one year of the annual FASAC survey on which it was included; 
fasac_pref is the average priority rating given a potential project by all FASAC members participating in the FASAC annual survey; fasb_pref is the average 
priority rating given a potential project by all FASB members participating in the FASAC annual survey; fasb_proxy is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 
if a potential project was mentioned in FASB status reports in the year preceding the FASAC annual survey; aud_pref, fin_pref, prep_pref, and other_pref are the 
average priority ratings assigned to a potential project by FASAC members classified as auditor, financial, preparer, or other, respectively, as defined in Section 
3.3; big_aud, little_aud, big_fin, little_fin, big_prep, and little_prep are the average preferences assigned to a potential project by auditor, financial, and preparer 
FASAC members, respectively, and separated by size according to the criteria described in Section 3.3.3. See Sections 3.2-3.4 for details. 
Panel A: Summary statistics (dependent variables)  
 
Panel B: Summary statistics (independent variables) 
   
1982-2001 n Mean Med Std Min Max 2002-2006 (n=81) n Mean Med Std Min Max
Y= agenda_addition 242 0.07 0.00 0.26 0.00 1.00 Y= agenda_addition 81 0.09 0.00 0.28 0.00 1.00
1982-2001 n Mean Med Std Min Max 2002-2006 n Mean Med Std Min Max
fasac_pref 242 0.39 0.38 0.16 0.03 0.85 fasac_pref 81 0.09 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.59
aud_pref 186 0.43 0.40 0.26 0.00 1.00 aud_pref 81 0.12 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.83
fin_pref 186 0.45 0.46 0.24 0.00 1.00 fin_pref 81 0.10 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.75
prep_pref 186 0.34 0.31 0.24 0.00 1.00 prep_pref 81 0.06 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.50
other_pref 186 0.51 0.52 0.28 0.00 1.00 other_pref 81 0.10 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.50
big_aud 94 0.51 0.50 0.27 0.00 1.00 big_aud 81 0.12 0.00 0.21 0.00 1.00
little_aud 94 0.39 0.38 0.32 0.00 1.00 little_aud 81 0.13 0.00 0.26 0.00 1.00
big_fin 94 0.47 0.50 0.26 0.00 1.00 big_fin 81 0.12 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.83
little_fin 94 0.55 0.57 0.30 0.00 1.00 little_fin 81 0.06 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.67
big_prep 94 0.37 0.33 0.24 0.00 1.00 big_prep 81 0.06 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.50
little_prep 94 0.39 0.36 0.33 0.00 1.00 little_prep 81 0.07 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.50
fasb_proxy 242 0.10 0.00 0.30 0.00 1.00 fasb_proxy 81 0.20 0.00 0.40 0.00 1.00
fasb_pref 36 0.48 0.50 0.22 0.06 1.00 fasb_pref 81 0.10 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.57
sec_proxy 242 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.00 1.00 sec_proxy 81 0.17 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.00
iasb 242 0.16 0.36 0.00 0.00 1.00 iasb 81 0.25 0.43 0.00 0.00 1.00 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Panel  C:  Pearson  correlation  coefficients
n=186 n=81
prep_pref prep_pref
fin_pref 0.06 fin_pref 0.47 ***
prep_pref 0.31 *** 0.28 *** prep_pref 0.52 *** 0.65 ***
other_pref 0.26 *** 0.29 *** 0.32 *** other_pref 0.20 * 0.21 * 0.33 ***
n=94 n=81
big_aud little_aud big_fin little_fin big_prep big_aud little_aud big_fin little_fin big_prep
little_aud 0.43 *** little_aud 0.35 ***
big_fin 0.13 0.06 big_fin 0.35 *** 0.55 ***
little_fin -0.02 0.00 0.14 little_fin 0.13 0.08 0.20 **
big_prep 0.38 *** 0.23 ** 0.39 *** 0.25 ** big_prep 0.36 *** 0.43 *** 0.58 *** 0.33 ***
little_prep 0.22 ** 0.30 *** 0.30 *** 0.21 ** 0.56 *** little_prep 0.16 0.43 *** 0.46 *** 0.09 0.38 ***
1982-1999 2002-2006
aud_pref fin_pref aud_pref fin_pref 
47 
Table 4: FASB agenda decisions on aggregate FASAC preferences 
Sample  is  242  (Panel  A)  and  81  (Panel  B)  potential  projects  about  which  FASAC  member  preferences  were 
collected in the 1982-2001 and 2002-2006 FASAC annual surveys, respectively. agenda_add is a binary variable 
that takes the value of 1 for potential projects added to the FASB’s agenda within one year of the annual FASAC 
survey on which it was included; fasac_pref is the average priority rating given a potential project by all FASAC 
members participating in the FASAC annual survey; fasb_pref is the average priority rating given a potential project 
by all FASB members participating in the FASAC annual survey; fasb_proxy is a binary variable that takes the 
value of 1 if a potential project was mentioned in FASB status reports in the year preceding the FASAC annual 
survey; sec_proxy is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 for potential projects mentioned favorably by the 
SEC in its annual report or at quarterly FASAC meetings. See Sections 3.2-3.4 for details. 
 
 
   
Panel A: 1982-2001^
Y= agenda_addition (t+1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
fasac_pref 5.44 *** 4.85 *** 3.79 * 3.17 * 3.27 * 3.16 *
fasb_proxy 1.44 ** 1.35 ** 1.80 *** 1.59 **
sec_proxy 1.30 2.47 **
iasb 1.09 * 1.57 **
Conditional FE
S.E. (Cluster)
Pseduo R-sq
n
Panel B: 2002-2006
Y= agenda_addition (t+1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
fasac_pref 10.03 *** 11.00 *** 8.36 *** 9.97 ** 11.74 ** 10.62 **
fasb_pref 3.55 3.67 *** 3.44 *** 3.16 ***
sec_proxy -1.40 -0.84
iasb -1.79 -0.63
Conditional FE
S.E. (Cluster)
Pseduo R-sq
n
Year
0.18
242
Significance levels (*) 10% level,  (**) 5% level,  (***) 1% level using a 2 tailed test.
Year
0.27
143 242 143 242 143
Year Year Year Year
0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16
Significance levels (*) 10% level,  (**) 5% level,  (***) 1% level using a 2 tailed test.
0.35 0.29 0.39
None Year None Year
^Excludes 1988, when no FASAC survey was conducted; 1996 and 1997, when the FASAC survey did not ask 
about potential projects; and 2000, due to inconsistent survey structure. See Table 2 for details.
81 67 81
0.26
67
Year Year
0.30 0.39
67
Year
81
Year Year Year
None Year
Year None Year None Year None 
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Table  5:  FASB  agenda  decisions  on  auditor,  financial,  preparer,  and  other  constituent 
preferences 
Sample  is  242  (Panel  A)  and  81  (Panel  B)  potential  projects  about  which  FASAC  member  preferences  were 
collected in the 1982-2001 and 2002-2006 FASAC annual surveys, respectively. agenda_add is a binary variable 
that takes the value of 1 for potential projects added to the FASB’s agenda within one year of the annual FASAC 
survey on which it was included; aud_pref, fin_pref, prep_pref, and other_pref are the average priority ratings 
assigned to a potential project by FASAC members classified as auditor, financial, preparer, or other, respectively, 
as defined in Section 3.3; fasb_pref is the average priority rating given a potential project by all FASB members 
participating in the FASAC annual survey; fasb_proxy is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if a potential 
project was mentioned in FASB status reports in the year preceding FASAC annual survey; sec_proxy is a binary 
variable that takes the value of 1 for potential projects mentioned favorably by the SEC in its annual report or at 
quarterly FASAC meetings. See Sections 3.2-3.4 for details. 
 
 
Panel A: 1982-2001^
Y= agenda_addition (t+1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
aud_pref 2.62 ** 3.34 * 2.40 ** 3.04 * 2.60 ** 3.91 ***
fin_pref 2.08 * 2.78 ** 1.95 * 2.74 ** 1.94 * 2.14 *
prep_pref 0.58 -0.82 0.15 -1.74 -0.17 -2.54
other_pref -1.60 -1.62 -1.54 -1.77 -1.49 -1.36
fasb_proxy 1.19 * 1.42 1.49 ** 2.03 **
sec_proxy 1.59 * 2.94 ***
iasb 0.74 1.23 *
Conditional FE 
S.E. (Cluster)
Pseduo R-sq
n
Panel B: 2002-2006
Y= agenda_addition (t+1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
aud_pref -0.48 -2.01 -1.58 -6.39 -2.36 -6.34
fin_pref 8.88 ** 15.79 *** 7.01 * 21.37 *** 9.96 ** 20.79 ***
prep_pref 1.55 1.71 3.32 5.72 6.51 6.67
other_pref 0.55 2.05 0.38 3.55 3.84 3.65
fasb_pref 3.73 7.99 ** 4.97 7.58 **
sec_proxy -2.43 -0.52
iasb -2.92 -0.44
Conditional FE 
S.E. (Cluster)
Pseduo R-sq
n
0.20 0.15 0.31
186 111 186 111 186 111
67
None Year None Year None Year
Year Year Year Year Year Year
0.09 0.16 0.12
81 67 81 67 81
Year
0.34 0.55 0.37 0.64 0.46 0.64
Year Year Year Year Year
^Excludes 1984 and 2001, because individual numerical scores were not provided; 1988, when no survey was 
conducted; 1996 and 1997, during which years the survey did not discuss potential projects; and 2000, due to 
inconsistent survey structure. See Table 2 for details.
Significance levels (*) 10% level,  (**) 5% level,  (***) 1% level using a 2 tailed test.
Significance levels (*) 10% level,  (**) 5% level,  (***) 1% level using a 2 tailed test.
None Year None Year None Year 
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Table  6:  FASB  agenda  decisions  on  auditor,  financial,  preparer,  and  other  constituent 
preferences disaggregated by size 
Sample  is  242  (Panel  A)  and  81  (Panel  B)  potential  projects  about  which  FASAC  member  preferences  were 
collected in the 1982-2001 and 2002-2006 FASAC annual surveys respectively. agenda_add is a binary variable 
that takes the value of 1 for potential projects added to the FASB’s agenda within one year of the annual FASAC 
survey on which it was included; aud_pref, fin_pref, prep_pref, and other_pref are the average priority ratings 
assigned to a potential project by FASAC members classified as auditor, financial, preparer, or other, respectively, 
as defined in Section 3.3; fasb_pref is the average priority rating given a potential project by all FASB members 
participating in the FASAC annual survey; fasb_proxy is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if a potential 
project was mentioned in FASB status reports in the year preceding the FASAC annual survey; sec_proxy is a 
binary variable that takes the value of 1 for potential projects mentioned favorably by the SEC in its annual report or 
at quarterly FASAC meetings. See Sections 3.2-3.4 for details. 
 
 
   
Panel A: 1982-2001
Y= agenda_addition (t+1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
big_aud 2.27 ** 4.49 *** 2.29 ** 4.73 *** 2.61 ** 4.91 ***
little_aud 0.57 -0.38 0.60 -0.50 0.71 -0.37
big_fin -0.59 1.36 -0.73 0.81 -0.84 0.31
little_fin -0.58 -0.41 -0.52 -0.09 -0.60 0.33
big_ind 0.51 -3.62 0.51 -4.39 -0.07 -5.46
little_ind 0.49 0.99 0.13 0.39 0.09 0.53
other_pref -0.58 -0.64 -0.47 0.31 -0.36 -0.26
fasb_proxy 0.70 1.76 0.87 1.82 **
sec_proxy 1.01 0.99
iasb 1.41 ** 1.64
Conditional FE
S.E. (Cluster)
Pseduo R-sq
n
Year
Year
0.28
52
Year
Year
0.20
52
None
Year
0.14
94
^Excludes 1984 and 2001, because individual numerical scores were not provided; 1988, when no survey was 
conducted; 1996 and 1997, during which years the survey did not discuss potential projects; and 2000, due to 
inconsistent survey structure. See Table 2 for details.
Significance levels (*) 10% level,  (**) 5% level,  (***) 1% level using a 2 tailed test.
None
Year
0.08
94
Year
Year
0.16
52
None
Year
0.09
94 
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Table 6 (continued): 
 
 
   
Panel B: 2002-2006
Y= agenda_addition (t+1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
big_aud 0.60 0.49 -0.24 -1.61 0.65 -1.57
little_aud -1.27 -1.61 -0.84 -1.05 -0.62 -1.46
big_fin 5.06 7.33 * 4.12 7.61 * 7.67 ** 7.80 **
little_fin 4.30 * 6.27 ** 3.57 6.91 ** 7.97 *** 7.10 **
big_ind 2.86 1.53 3.50 2.21 2.21 2.24
little_ind -0.13 0.19 0.09 0.49 -2.35 0.70
other_pref 1.51 1.85 1.12 2.13 7.52 2.23
fasb_pref 2.67 5.00 3.84 5.23
sec_proxy -0.63 0.54
iasb -0.64 ^
Conditional FE
S.E. (Cluster)
Pseduo R-sq
n
^ Log-likelihood function is not concave when iasb is included in column (6) estimation.
67 81 67 81 67 81
Year
0.34 0.50 0.35 0.54 0.36 0.54
Year Year Year Year Year
None Year None Year None Year
Significance levels (*) 10% level,  (**) 5% level,  (***) 1% level using a 2 tailed test. 
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Table 7: Re-estimation of Table 5 Columns (6) after controlling for finance related agenda 
topics 
Sample is 111 (Column 1) and 67 (Column 2) potential projects used for estimation in Table 5 Panels A and B 
Column (6). agenda_add is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 for potential projects added to the FASB’s 
agenda within one year of the annual FASAC survey on which it was included; aud_pref, fin_pref, prep_pref, and 
other_pref are the average priority ratings assigned to a potential project by FASAC members classified as auditor, 
financial, preparer, or other, respectively, as defined in Section 3.3; fasb_pref is the average priority rating given a 
potential project by all FASB members participating in the FASAC annual survey; fasb_proxy is a binary variable 
that takes the value of 1 if a potential project was mentioned in FASB status reports in the year preceding FASAC 
annual survey; sec_proxy is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 for potential projects mentioned favorably by 
the SEC in its annual report or at quarterly FASAC meetings. fin_issue is a binary variable which takes a value of 1 
for potential projects pertaining to financial transactions.  See Sections 3.2-3.4 and 6.1 for details. 
 
 
 
(1) (2)
Y= agenda_addition (t+1)
aud_pref 4.02 ** -5.16
fin_pref 3.07 16.25 ***
prep_pref -2.68 6.57
other_pref -1.43 2.87
fasb_proxy 1.94 ** 6.40 ***
sec_proxy 3.12 *** -2.89
iasb 1.45 * -0.16
fin_issue 1.51 -42.70 ***
fin_pref*fin_issue -1.57 105.50 ***
Conditional FE 
S.E. (Cluster)
Pseduo R-sq
n
1982-2001 2002-2006
Significance levels (*) 10% level,  (**) 5% level,  (***) 
1% level using a 2 tailed test.
111 67
0.32 0.66
Year Year
None Year